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From Attorney General to
Backbencher or Opposition Legislator:
The Lawyer’s Continuing Duty of
Confidentiality to the Former Client
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ABSTRACT
This note uses a recent incident from Manitoba to reflect on the
professional duty of confidentiality owed to the Crown by a former
Attorney General as lawyer. The duty of confidentiality survives the lawyerclient relationship. As a fiduciary, the lawyer cannot disclose or use the
client’s confidential information for her own benefit or the benefit of a
third party, or against the client. These obligations constrain the former
Attorney General in her conduct as an opposition legislator and suggest
that she should not accept an appointment as Justice critic for her caucus.
While parliamentary privilege protects the former Attorney General who
breaches these obligations in the legislature from professional
consequences, as an opposition legislator she is particularly vulnerable to
consequences within the legislature.

Keywords: Manitoba; Attorney General; Confidentiality; Legal Ethics;
Legislatures; Legislators; Politics.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A

n Attorney General is privy to the inner workings of her
government, including all the legal advice provided to it. As a
recent incident from Manitoba suggests, that knowledge can be a
dangerously temptation for a former Attorney General, particularly an
opposition legislator, to use to legitimately criticize a subsequent
government or simply to embarrass it.
In late 2017, the floor-crossing prohibition in The Legislative Assembly
Act of Manitoba was under fire.1 Newly Independent MLA Steven
Fletcher had mounted a Charter challenge to the prohibition and the
Conservative government had introduced a bill that would repeal the
prohibition.2 The government argued that the bill would avoid using
public resources to defend against Fletcher’s challenge3 – and Fletcher had
suggested that the government could more easily and quickly save that
money by conceding his challenge.4 It was in this context that former
Attorney General, and then-opposition MLA,5 Andrew Swan made these
comments in the legislature:
He’s asked a number of times, well, why don’t they just throw in the towel? Well,
the reason they can’t throw in the towel is because they’ve got advice, I know,
1

The Legislative Assembly Act, CCSM c L110, s 52.3.1. (Section 52.3.1 provided that an
MLA who left a party’s caucus, for any reason, could not join the caucus of any other
party.) See Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Unconstitutional or Just Unworkable? The Life
and Death of a Prohibition on Floor-Crossing in Fletcher v the Government of Manitoba”
(2019) 42:1 Manitoba LJ 51 at 52-53 [Martin, “Unworkable”].

2

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss 2(b), 3, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11; Bill 4, The Legislative
Assembly Amendment Act (Member Changing Parties); 34th Leg, 3rd Sess, Manitoba
(2017); Martin, “Unworkable”, supra note 1 at 54.

3

Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings, 41-3, vol LXXI No 8B (30
November 2017) at 263, 264, 265 (Hon Heather Stefanson) [Hansard]; Martin,
“Unworkable”, supra note 1 at 54.

4

Hansard, ibid at 266 (Steven Fletcher); Martin, “Unworkable”, supra note 1 at 54.

5

Andrew Swan, while a former Justice critic, had been replaced as Justice critic in
September 2017 and, at this time, was Health critic. See Austin Grabish, “Wab Kinew
reveals his inner circle, Manitoba Opposition critics” CBC News (21 September 2017,
online:
<www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/manitoba-ndp-caucus-change1.4300533> [https://perma.cc/J6ZF-ABHP].
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from their own department saying, well, actually, we think there is a very
arguable case that this legislation continues to be constitutional. That’s the
6
problem that this minister has.

How did Swan know this? It is not clear. Perhaps the government had
released the advice publicly. Perhaps someone had leaked the advice to
Swan. But perhaps Swan knew because the same advice had been provided
while he was Attorney General. If this were the case – and it may not have
been – Swan by revealing this advice would have been violating his duty of
confidentiality to the Crown as a former client.
In this note, I consider how the continuing duty of confidentiality
applies to a former Attorney General. I explain that the former Attorney
General as lawyer owes this duty to the Crown in right of the province (or
Canada), that it can only be properly waived by the Lieutenant Governor
in Council (or the Governor in Council, federally), and thus that the
former Attorney General cannot share or use knowledge of past advice for
any purposes, political or otherwise, noble or ignoble.
I begin by considering the curious position of the Attorney General as
lawyer. Then I consider the possibility of waiver. I acknowledge
parliamentary privilege. I then conclude by reflecting on the implications
of my analysis, both for the former Attorney General as Justice critic and
for legal ethics and government itself.

II. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AS LAWYER
As recognized by many often and elsewhere, the Attorney General is
the chief law officer of the Crown.7 As such, assuming she is a lawyer,8 she

6

Hansard, ibid at 278 (Andrew Swan) [emphasis added]. Cited but not quoted in
Martin, “Unworkable”, supra note 1 at 54-55.

7

See e.g. The Department of Justice Act, CCSM c J35, s 2(a): “The minister [of Justice]… is
the official legal adviser of the Lieutenant Governor and the legal member of the
Executive Council”. See also s 2(1) on the explicit duties of the Attorney General. See
also Ontario v Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43 at para 5, [2013] 3
SCR 3.

8

For a discussion of the non-lawyer Attorney General, see Andrew Flavelle Martin,
“The Attorney General as Lawyer (?): Confidentiality upon Resignation from Cabinet”
(2015) 38:1 Dal LJ 147 at 166-69.
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is bound by the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality.9 This duty is owed to the
client, i.e. the Crown in right of Canada or the province.
Vis-à-vis the lawyers in her department, the Attorney General may
look and feel in some ways like a client or a representative of the client.
While the Attorney General provides legal advice to Cabinet, that advice
does not form in a vacuum and rarely originates in the mind and by the
hand of the Attorney General herself. The vast majority of that advice
comes from departmental lawyers to the Attorney General. Thus the
Attorney General may appear to be in the situation of a representative of
the client, receiving advice from lawyers and relaying it to her colleagues
and superiors who are also officers of the client. Nonetheless, the Attorney
General is, as a matter of law, a lawyer in this circumstance. As such she
owes to the client the same duties that any lawyer owes to any client –
among them, a duty of confidentiality.
The lawyer’s duty of confidentiality is broad, encompassing “all
information concerning the business and affairs of a client acquired in the
course of the professional relationship”.10 Moreover, the duty of
confidentiality is owed to both current and former clients alike: “The duty
survives the professional relationship and continues indefinitely after the
lawyer has ceased to act for the client, whether or not differences have arisen
between them.”11 The fact that the former Attorney General has been
replaced as chief law officer of the Crown does not affect her continuing
duty of confidentiality.

9

Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct (Ottawa:
FLSC, 2009, last amended 2019), r 3.3-1, online: Federation of Law Societies of
Canada <www.flsc.ca> [https://perma.cc/X96C-LJ4G] [FLSC Model Code]. Law Society
of Manitoba, Code of Professional Conduct (Winnipeg: LSM 2010), r 3.3-1, online:
<https://lawsociety.mb.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/ENG-Code-of-ProfessionalConduct-2020-02-05.pdf> [https://perma.cc/AZ97-BN2S] [Manitoba Code] is
substantively identical.

10

FLSC Model Code, supra note 9, r 3.3-1, commentary 3. Manitoba Code, supra note 9, r
3.3-1, commentary 3 is identical.

11

FLSC Model Code, supra note 9, r 3.3-1, commentary 3 [emphasis added]. Manitoba
Code, supra note 9, r 3.3-1, commentary 3 is identical.
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As a fiduciary,12 a lawyer is prohibited not only from disclosing her
client’s confidential information but also from otherwise using that
information for her own benefit, or the benefit of a third party, or to the
client’s detriment.13
This rule against use is rarely applied in the case law, but that rarity
does not imply a lack of importance. A leading case, and a brazen violation
of this obligation, is Szarfer v Chodos, in which the lawyer used his client’s
confidential information to have an affair with the client’s spouse.14 A
more extreme example is where the lawyer uses information that the client
is vulnerable to initiate a sexual relationship with the client.15 A more
mundane example is the purchase of real estate from a client, where the
lawyer knows the client’s intended sales price and immediate need for
money.16
What creates strangeness here is the nature of responsible government
and the apolitical civil service in Canada. In a change of government, the
Attorney General is replaced but the Crown and its departmental lawyers
remain. Assuming no change in the relevant factual and legal
circumstances, the departmental lawyers will presumably (and properly)
give the same advice to the new Attorney General and Cabinet as they
gave to the previous Attorney General and Cabinet on the same matter.
The previous Attorney General, if still a legislator, is now in opposition.
She has special knowledge of the legal advice being given to the current
government, by virtue of remembering the legal advice that was given to
12

FLSC Model Code, supra note 9, r 3.3-2, commentary 1: “The fiduciary relationship
between a lawyer and a client forbids the lawyer or a third person from benefiting
from the lawyer’s use of a client’s confidential information.” Manitoba Code, supra note
9, r 3.3-2, commentary 1 is identical.

13

FLSC Model Code, supra note 9, r 3.3-2: “A lawyer must not use or disclose a client’s or
former client’s confidential information to the disadvantage of the client or former
client, or for the benefit of the lawyer or a third person without the consent of the
client or former client.” See also Manitoba Code, supra note 9, r 3.3-2, which is
substantively identical.

14

Szarfer v Chodos (1986), 54 OR (2d) 663, 27 DLR (4th) 388 (HC), aff’d (1988) 66 OR
(2d) 350 (CA).

15

The Law Society of Upper Canada v Mark Elliott Joseph, 2003 CanLII 39550 at paras 1720, [2003] LSDD No 34.

16

Law Society of Saskatchewan v Abrametz, 2017 SKLSS 4 at paras 68-75, var’d on other
grounds (costs), 2018 SKCA 37.
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her government. Indeed, as part of her Majesty’s loyal opposition, her
appropriate role is to criticize the decision and actions of the current
government.
Consider a hypothetical example around the floor-crossing
prohibition. Departmental lawyers advise Attorney General X that there is
a high likelihood that the floor-crossing prohibition is constitutional. She
may, or may not, convey that advice to Cabinet. After an intervening
change in government, X is now an opposition legislator. She can make a
credible guess as to what legal advice is currently being provided because
she knows what legal advice was previously provided. But in order to
explain why she “knows” about that current advice, she has to disclose the
previous advice. Indeed, even if she makes the bare assertion that she
“knows” about the current advice, the alert listener can make a fair
assumption that she is likely basing that knowledge on her knowledge of
the previous advice.
How does the situation of the former Attorney General compare to a
non-Attorney General former member of Cabinet? Consider for example
legislator Y, who was the Minister of Finance while X was Attorney
General and, like X, is now an opposition legislator after the intervening
change in government. While Minister of Finance, Y alongside his thenCabinet colleagues received advice from Attorney General X that there is a
high likelihood that the floor-crossing prohibition is constitutional. Y, like
X, can now make a credible guess that the current Cabinet is receiving the
same advice about the floor-crossing prohibition. Y, unlike X, is not
bound by the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality from revealing that advice;
but like X, he is bound by Cabinet confidence from revealing that
advice.17 For my purposes, I focus on the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality.
While this situation may have a rare parallel in the private practice of
law, it will be a fairly regular occurrence in the context of government.
One can imagine a parallel situation in which Z, the chief legal officer of a
company, leaves that company and then becomes a regular critic of the
company itself, or perhaps even the chief legal officer of a rival company.
(I recognize here that non-compete agreements may be common in these
circumstances, which goes again to how unusual this situation would be in
the private sector.) However, the situation of former Attorney General X
and former Minister of Finance Y will occur much more frequently, given
17

See e.g. The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, CCSM c F175, s 19.
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that in the Canadian system an opposition party’s caucus will often
include former Cabinet ministers. Less frequent, but still presenting
danger, is the situation of an Attorney General who is demoted or who is
removed from caucus and forced to sit as an independent.18

III. WAIVER
The lawyer’s duty of confidentiality, like the broader duty of Cabinet
confidence, can be waived by the client. While the current Attorney
General may be able to waive confidentiality or Cabinet confidence on
behalf of the government, the best and most definitive approach is for
Cabinet, i.e. the Governor in Council or the Lieutenant Governor in
Council, to make the waiver.19
A helpful parallel may be drawn to the conduct of former Attorney
General Jody Wilson-Raybould during the fallout over the SNC Lavalin
affair in the spring of 2019. Having been shuffled into another portfolio,
she was at that time still in Cabinet but no longer the Attorney General.
She was nonetheless adamant that she could not discuss her
communications with representatives of the government while she was
Attorney General, including the Prime Minister and the Clerk of the Privy
Council, without a waiver of solicitor-client privilege and Cabinet
confidence.20 The eventual waiver also covered lawyer-client
confidentiality: “Her Excellency the Governor General in Council,
on the recommendation of the Prime Minister… waives, to the extent

18

For example, former Attorney General for Canada, Jodu Wilson-Raybould. See e.g.
Brian Platt, “Tuesday Night Massacre: Trudeau ejects Jody Wilson-Raybould, Jane
Philpott from Liberal caucus” The National Post (2 April 2019), online
<nationalpost.com/news/politics/jody-wilson-raybould-says-shes-been-kicked-out-ofthe-liberal-caucus> [https://perma.cc/4VHX-XXDR].

19

See e.g. the waiver relating to former Attorney General for Canada, Jody WilsonRaybould: PC 2019-0105 (25 February 2019), online: <orders-incouncil.canada.ca/attachment.php?attach=37424&lang=en> [https://perma.cc/L3Q82GBY] [Wilson-Raybould waiver].

20

While my focus in this article is on the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality, solicitor-client
privilege applies to some of the same information and is stronger in law. The waiver of
solicitor-client privilege is necessarily a waiver of the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality.
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they apply, solicitor-client privilege and any other relevant duty of
confidentiality to the Government of Canada”.21
However, in the situation of former Attorney General X, there would
appear to be no reason for the current government to waive X’s duty of
confidentiality.
Could a cunning outgoing government, keen to use their knowledge
to attack the incoming government, pre-emptively waive lawyer-client
confidentiality and Cabinet confidence for themselves? While this would
be highly controversial, it faces no clear legal impediment and, like many
other political measures, would only have political repercussions (if any).

IV. PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE AND THE ROLE OF THE
SPEAKER
The major asterisk to the preceding discussion is parliamentary
privilege. Legislator X, the former Attorney General, is forbidden by
lawyer-client confidentiality and Cabinet confidence from revealing the
legal advice from her time in office or using it to her benefit or the client’s
detriment. Nonetheless, she cannot face any regulatory or legal
consequences for revealing this advice inside the legislature.22 She may
face consequences within the legislature – and indeed, in a majority
government situation, as an opposition legislator will be quite vulnerable
to the imposition of such consequences.
While one might hope that the Speaker has a role to play in
preventing, or at least in chastising, members from breaching such duties
in the legislature, there is little indication of such a role. The main
grounds on which the Speaker will intervene are incivility or

21

Wilson-Raybould waiver, supra note 19 [emphasis added].

22

Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Immunity of the Attorney General to Law Society
Discipline” (2016) 94:2 Can Bar Rev 413 at 429-430 [Martin, “Attorney General
Discipline”].
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unparliamentary language and the sub judice convention.23 Moreover, the
Standing Orders of the House of Commons, for example, do not mention
lawyers’ duties of confidentiality or solicitor-client privilege.24
One could argue that the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality is an undue
constraint on legislators’ fundamental responsibility to question the
government – that is, that the breach of this duty is desirable and
necessary to properly fulfill the opposition’s function of holding the
government accountable. In a somewhat parallel example, Adam Dodek
has argued that parliamentary privilege outweighs solicitor-client privilege
in terms of access to documents: “At its core, parliamentary privilege is
about protecting the essential functions of Parliament to allow it to fulfil
its roles as a house of debate and the organ of government charged with
holding the executive to account.”25 This characterization matches that
adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in House of Commons v Vaid,
which is that parliamentary privilege protects the ability of legislators to
discharge their proper functions: “Parliamentary privilege in the Canadian
context is the sum of the privileges, immunities and powers enjoyed by the
Senate, the House of Commons and provincial legislative assemblies, and
by each member individually, without which they could not discharge
their functions”.26 For opposition legislators in particular, “holding the
executive to account” is the central function.
Imagine a variant situation, in which former Attorney General X
concludes, based on the advice she received while Attorney General, that
23

Marc Bosc & André Gagnon, House of Commons Procedure and Practice, 3d ed (Ottawa:
House of Commons, 2017), Chapter 7, “The Speaker and Other Presiding Officers of
the
House”,
online:
<https://www.ourcommons.ca/About/ProcedureAndPractice3rdEdition/ch_07_1e.html#7-1-3> [https://perma.cc/43NY-VQZK]. See also Chapter 13, “Rules of Order
and
Decorum”,
online:
<www.ourcommons.ca/About/ProcedureAndPractice3rdEdition/ch_13_3-e.html>
[https://perma.cc/YC3G-5MUL].

24

House of Commons, Standing Orders of the House of Commons (29 November 2018),
online:
<www.ourcommons.ca/About/StandingOrders/SOPDF.pdf>
[https://perma.cc/J8YX-4XYH].

25

Adam Dodek, “Second Opinion: Parliament Trumps Solicitor-Client Privilege” Law
Times (28 June 2010), online: <www.lawtimesnews.com/archive/second-opinionparliament-trumps-solicitor-client-privilege/260142> [https://perma.cc/AAE4-DES9].

26

Canada (House of Commons) v Vaid, 2005 SCC 30 at para 29.
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the current government is misrepresenting the legal advice it has received.
Arguably, by purporting to disclose that advice (albeit falsely), the
government has implicitly and necessarily waived solicitor-client privilege
over that advice and released its lawyers from their duties of confidentiality
in relation to that advice. However, whether or not waiver applies, it
appears to be in the public interest that legislator X expose that
misrepresentation. Does that credit to the public interest outweigh the
harm to the public interest of legislator X breaching her duty of
confidentiality? Given the strength of parliamentary privilege, I recognize
that some might argue that the uncomfortable legal answer appears to be
yes.

V. IMPLICATIONS: THE FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL AS
JUSTICE CRITIC
My analysis suggests that a former Attorney General, while appearing
uniquely suited to be Justice critic, will be significantly restricted in that
role and should indeed perhaps avoid it entirely.
The former Attorney General as justice critic may face a conflict of
interest. The FLSC Model Code defines a conflict of interest as “the
existence of a substantial risk that a lawyer’s loyalty to or representation of
a client would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer’s own
interest or the lawyer’s duties to another client, a former client, or a third
person.”27 The commentary elaborates that “[t]he risk must be more than
a mere possibility; there must be a genuine, serious risk to the duty of
loyalty or to client representation”.28
The nature of that conflict depends on whether her party, or her
caucus, or her opposition leader, is properly considered a client for whom
former Attorney General X is practicing law. (This will depend to some
extent on the ability and skill of the former Attorney General to provide
legal advice without the support of departmental lawyers.) If so, she is in a
conflict between the interests of the former client and the interests of the
current client. The current client’s interest is to use confidential advice to
27

FLSC Model Code, supra note 9, r 1.1-1. The Manitoba Code, supra note 9, r 1.1-1, is
identical.

28

FLSC Model Code, supra note 9, r 3.4-1, commentary 2. The Manitoba Code, supra note
9, r 3.4-1, commentary 2, is identical.
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criticize the government; the former client’s interest, indeed right, is for
that information to remain confidential. If she is not practicing law, while
there is not a conflict as defined in the Code, the lawyer’s personal and
political interest is in using that confidential information for the benefit of
herself and her party in opposition, while her professional obligation is to
refrain from doing so – and thus the former Attorney General is at risk of
breaching the rule on confidentiality. In the face of this clash, the former
Attorney General must not breach her obligation of confidentiality though
she may be sorely tempted to do so.
A lawyer is free to act against a former client if the matters are
unrelated and the lawyer does not have “relevant confidential information
arising from the representation of the former client that may prejudice
that client”.29 It would appear that many matters on which a Justice critic
and former Attorney General would work and comment would be related
to matters for which that former Attorney General had been responsible
while in office, or matters in which the former Attorney General has
relevant confidential information.
Moreover, a former Attorney General does not avoid this risk entirely
by refusing the formal role of Justice critic. Her caucus colleagues, who
may not be lawyers and may not understand the rules around
confidentiality, will likely still want to use her confidential information for
their own purposes. In addition to resisting this pressure, the former
Attorney General should educate her colleagues about the importance of
lawyers’ professional obligations to the protection of the public interest.

VI. IMPLICATIONS: WHY THIS MATTERS
At the end of the day, does any of this matter? The answer depends on
the precise nature of the question. As a political matter, it would be seem
to be only the most controversial legal advice the revelation of which
would prompt serious political consequences.
But from a legal ethics perspective, the breach – even if the practical
implications are minimal, which I argue they are not – is a fundamental
one that strikes at the heart of public confidence in the legal profession.
Indeed, confidentiality is one of the most important duties of the lawyer
29

FLSC Model Code, supra note 9, r 3.4-10(c). The Manitoba Code, supra note 9, r 3.410(c) is identical.
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for maintaining that public confidence in the profession. As the Supreme
Court of Canada has emphasized, confidentiality is integral to the lawyerclient relationship: “Experience shows that people who have a legal
problem will often not make a clean breast of the facts to a lawyer without
an assurance of confidentiality “as close to absolute as possible””.30 Put
simply, “[i]f lawyers do not maintain client confidentiality, the public’s
trust in our profession will soon become eroded and irreparably
harmed.”31
Thus, even if former Attorney General X by revealing the legal advice
he received while Attorney General advances some fundamental public
purpose, such as legitimately holding the current government to account,
the damage to the public interest would outweigh that benefit.
How would such a breach of confidentiality change the behaviour of
the government and its lawyers? Central here is the fact that the Crown is
a continuing entity. Departmental lawyers would be less likely to give frank
and candid legal advice to the Attorney General if they thought that she
might use that advice against the government in the future. In turn, the
Attorney General, to the extent that she was reliant on those departmental
lawyers to generate legal advice to Cabinet, would be less able to perform
her functions competently. The departmental lawyers would be at risk of
breaching their obligations of candour to the client,32 and both the
departmental lawyers and the Attorney General would be at risk of
breaching their duties of competence.33
Less important as a matter of law and legal ethics, but arguably as
important to the functioning of the apolitical civil service and the longterm interests of the Crown, former Attorney General X has broken trust
with her former departmental lawyers by using their advice to criticize or
embarrass the government.
30

Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v Blood Tribe Department of Health, 2008 SCC 44 at para
9, quoting from R v McClure, 2001 SCC 14 at para 35.

31

Law Society of Alberta v Robidoux, 2014 ABLS 5 at para 26, [2014] LSDD No 117.

32

FLSC Model Code, supra note 9, r 3.2-2: “When advising a client, a lawyer must be
honest and candid and must inform the client of all information known to the lawyer
that may affect the interests of the client in the matter.” See also Manitoba Code, supra
note 9, r 3.1-2, which is identical.

33

FLSC Model Code, supra note 9, r 3.1-2. See also Manitoba Code, supra note 9, r 3.1-2,
which is identical.
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While legal ethics should not be reduced to discipline alone, in light
of the brazenness and consequences of the actions of former Attorney
General X, a relevant question becomes whether former Attorney General
X should be disciplined by the law society. As has been explained
elsewhere,34 there are few restrictions on the law society’s regulatory and
disciplinary jurisdiction over the Attorney General. Assuming that former
Attorney General X remains a lawyer, there is no reason that this
jurisdiction would be any different for a former Attorney General than for
a current Attorney General. Other than parliamentary privilege, which I
discussed above, there would be no barrier to discipline of former
Attorney General X. Indeed, even in Ontario, where there the Attorney
General enjoys statutory immunity against law society discipline, that
immunity is limited to “anything done by him or her while exercising the
functions of such office”,35 and thus would not apply to a breach of
confidentiality after X ceased to be Attorney General. Thus, if former
Attorney General X were to repeat the breach outside the legislature and
thus beyond parliamentary privilege, the law society would have
disciplinary jurisdiction.
I would argue that the need for denunciation and deterrence of this
kind of breach favours law society action. Such action protects the public
interest, as law societies are charged to do36 – not only the public interest
in public confidence in the legal profession, but the public interest in the
competent and efficient functioning of government. I would also argue
that the law society should take such a breach of lawyer-client
confidentiality more seriously than most governments would appear to
take a breach of cabinet confidence.

34

Martin, “Attorney General Discipline”, supra note 22.

35

Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8, s 13(3), as discussed in Martin, “Attorney General
Discipline”, supra note 22 at 431-32.

36

See e.g. Legal Profession Act, CCSM c L107, s 3(1): “The purpose of the society is to
uphold and protect the public interest in the delivery of legal services with
competence, integrity and independence.”

